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Introduction	
New	scholarly	paradigms	in	the	study	of	criminal	law	come	along	rather	rarely.	Despite	extensive	
published	work	on	this	core	topic	in	the	educational	curriculum	and	intellectual	programme	of	
the	legal	academy	in	most	countries,	the	basic	conceptual	tools	which	inform	its	exposition	and	
analysis	 in	mainstream	scholarship	have	remained	relatively	stable	over	 the	 last	half	 century.	
Moreover,	they	have	not	evolved	in	proportion	to	the	development	of	the	field	at	large.	Valuable	
attention	 to	 rethinking	 the	 conceptual	 parameters	 of	 the	 field	 has	 come	 from	 contextual,	
historical,	 feminist	 or	 otherwise	 critical	 scholarship	 (Ashworth	 1991;	 Farmer	 2016;	 Fletcher	
1978;	 Loughnan	 2012;	 Naffine	 2009;	 Norrie	 2014;	 Wells	 and	 Quick	 2010);	 and—as	 the	
contributors	 to	 this	 fine	 essay	 note—from	 site‐specific	 areas	 of	 criminalisation.	 But,	 the	
conceptual	basis	 for	 theorisation	remains	a	pressing	concern.	This	 is	particularly	so	given	the	
recognition,	 in	much	 of	 the	most	 innovative	 recent	 scholarship,	 that	 the	 field	 of	 criminal	 law	
cannot	be	fully	understood	independent	of	the	dynamics	of	criminalisation	conceived	as	a	broad	
social	practice.	This	development	is	giving	a	new	spin	to	the	longstanding	focus	in	theoretically	
informed	 criminal	 law	 scholarship	 on	 the	 question	 of	 responsibility	 (Ashworth	 forthcoming;	
Ashworth	and	Zedner	2014;	Duff	et	al.	2010,	2011,	2013,	2014;	Farmer	2016;	Horder	1992;	Lacey	
2016;	McSherry,	Norrie	and	Bronitt	2009;	Norrie	2016;	Ramsay	2012).		
	
This	 turn	 to	criminalisation	 is	 to	be	welcomed,	yet	many	of	 the	 interpretive	arguments	about	
criminal	 law	 which	 it	 has	 generated—including,	 I	 should	 make	 clear,	 my	 own—depend	 on	
assumptions	about	patterns	of	criminalisation	which	it	is	not	clear	we,	as	yet,	have	the	conceptual	
tools	or	empirical	data	 to	 fully	substantiate.	This	really	came	home	to	me	about	a	decade	ago	
when	 I	was	 commissioned	 to	write	a	piece	on	criminalisation	 in	historical	perspective	 (Lacey	
2009).	When	 I	 asked	myself	 about	 the	detailed	basis	 for	 even	some	of	 the	most	widely	made	
claims	in	this	area—for	instance,	that	there	had	been	an	explosion	of	regulatory	criminalisation	
in	 England	 in	 the	 nineteenth	 century;	 or	 that	 preventive	 offences	 are	 on	 the	 rise—the	more	
thought	I	gave	to	the	propositions,	the	more	elusive	they	seemed.	Even	restricting	ourselves	to	
legislation,	what	counts	as	a	single	offence?	How	should	we	account	for	criminal	offences	which	
arise	in	other	forms	of	regulatory	regime	(Lacey	2004)?	And	should	we	be	focusing	on,	as	it	were,	
the	law	in	the	books,	or	the	law	as	interpreted	and	enforced?	
	
It	is	precisely	these	sorts	or	questions	which	McNamara,	Quilter,	Hogg,	Douglas,	Loughnan	and	
Brown	 (this	 issue)	have	begun	 to	 tackle,	 and	 their	 effort	 is	 hugely	welcome.	 In	what	 follows,	
rather	than	summarising	their	account—which	is	very	clearly	and	succinctly	set	out	in	their	own	
essay—I	will	set	out	briefly	the	challenges	here	as	I	see	them,	distinguishing	between	different	
sorts	of	conceptual,	interpretive	and	socio‐legal	question	about	criminalisation.	I	will	then	move	
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on	 to	 evaluate	 how	 effectively	 the	 modalities	 approach	 can	 resolve	 each	 of	 the	 identified	
questions,	and	how	it	might	be	extended,	adapted	or	further	developed	to	meet	even	more.	
	
Criminalisation:	The	conceptual	and	empirical	problems	
McNamara	and	colleagues	(‘the	modalities	team’)	are	absolutely	right	to	identify	a	lacuna	in	the	
theoretical	apparatus	in	criminal	law	scholarship,	which	increasingly	asserts	the	importance	of	
understanding	patterns	 of	 criminalisation,	 yet	 tends	 to	 duck	 the	 question	of	 how,	 empirically	
and/or	conceptually,	we	can	track	those	patterns.	Important	initial	efforts	here	have	been	made,	
notably	 by	Andrew	Ashworth	 and	Meredith	Blake	 (1996)	 in	 a	pioneering	 essay	published	20	
years	ago,	and	more	recently	by	James	Chalmers	and	Fiona	Leverick	(Chalmers	2014;	Chalmers	
and	Leverick	2013).	But,	there	is	undoubtedly—as	the	authors	of	these	honourable	exceptions	
would	 doubtless	 attest—further	 progress	 to	 be	made.	 The	 modalities	 team	 are	 also	 right	 to	
suggest	that	the	accompanying	lack	of	reflexivity	in	the	field	tends	to	lead	to	both	a	skewed	view	
of	the	material	to	be	theorised,	and	an	over‐emphasis	on	the	headline	issue	of	so‐called	 ‘over‐
criminalisation’.	 Powerful	 as	 the	 ‘over‐criminalisation’	 scholarship	 has	 been,	 in	 the	 hands	 of	
influential	scholars	like	Doug	Husak	(2008;	Duff	et	al.	2010,	2014),	it	is	focused	primarily	on	the	
normative	arguments	against	excessive	use	of	the	state’s	criminalisation	power,	informed	by	a	
very	particular	sample	of	(certainly	worrying)	recent	developments	rather	than	by	an	assessment	
of	the	overall	state	of	the	criminal	law,	even	in	any	one	country.		
	
In	trying	to	elaborate	the	problems	to	be	faced	here,	it	is	useful	to	distinguish	between	two	broad	
pairs	 of	 ways	 of	 thinking	 about	 criminalisation	 (Lacey	 2009,	 2016:	 Chapter	 1).	 First,	 we	 can	
distinguish	 between	 what	 we	 might	 call	 ‘formal	 criminalisation’—the	 full	 range	 of	 offences,	
whether	 created	 by	 statute	 or	 customary/common	 law,	 which	 are	 valid	 in	 a	 particular	 legal	
system	at	any	moment	in	time—and	‘substantive	criminalisation’—the	patterns	of	enforcement	
of	 those	 valid	 norms	 through	 the	 criminal	 process.	 Second,	 we	 can	 distinguish	 between	
criminalisation	as	a	set	of	processes	or	practices,	encompassing	everything	from	legislation	and	
judicial	 interpretation	to	prosecution	and	crime,	recording	and	reporting	decisions	by	officials	
and,	indeed,	by	lay	people;	and	criminalisation	as	an	outcome,	as	not	only	the	conviction	rates	
which	most	vividly	exemplify	the	impact	of	substantive	criminalisation	but	also	the	full	range	of	
broader	 social,	 cultural,	 economic,	 emotional	 and	 political	 effects	 of	 those	 processes.	 No	 one	
project	 can,	 of	 course,	 hope	 to	 focus	 on	 each	 of	 these	 processes	 or	 practices	 at	 once;	 as	 the	
modalities	 team	 recognise,	 even	within	 any	one,	 over‐generalisation	 is	 a	 key	danger.	 But	 any	
project	dealing	with	one	half	of	either	pair	needs	to	be	aware	of	both	its	potentially	complex	and	
indirect	 relation	 with	 the	 other	 half,	 and	 with	 the	 other	 pair	 (formal	 for	 substantive	
criminalisation,	 and	 vice	 versa;	 the	 upshot	 of	 processes	 of	 criminalisation	 for	 outcomes	 and,	
indeed,	vice	versa	once	again).		
	
The	modalities	approach:	Formal	criminalisation	…	
The	 modalities	 team	 set	 out	 to	 provide	 a	 more	 differentiated	 conceptual	 scheme	 which	 can	
illuminate	the	realities	of	criminalisation,	which	is,	as	they	rightly	argue,	a	necessary	precursor	
to	 thinking	 clearly	 about	 how	 criminalisation	 should	 be	 used,	 normatively	 speaking.	 Their	
aspiration	is	‘to	have	a	better	understanding	of	why,	when	and	how	criminalisation	has	been	and	
is	the	chosen	policy	response	to	an	identified	harm	or	risk,	and	with	what	effects’	(McNamara	et	
al.	 in	 this	 issue:	 92).	 To	 this	 end,	 they	 differentiate	 four	 main	 modalities	 of	 criminalisation,	
distinguishing	 legislative	 provisions	 which	 expand,	 contract	 or	 rationalise	 the	 boundaries	 of	
criminalisation;	 or	 which	 criminalise,	 decriminalise	 or	 otherwise	 reshape	 criminalisation	 in	
pursuit	 of	 the	 interests	 of	 crime	 victims.	 Further,	 two	 of	 these	 four	 principal	 modalities	 are	
subdivided.	The	expanding	criminalisation	modality	is	divided	into	nine	further	sub‐modalities	
which	encompass	not	merely	formal	offence	definition	change	but	also	adaptations	in	penalties,	
procedural	safeguards,	defences,	and	enforcement	and	pre‐	or	post‐correctional	powers,	as	well	
as	encompassing	offences	within	regulatory	regimes	and	civil/criminal	hybrids.	The	contracting	
criminalisation	divides	into	six	sub‐modalities	covering	matters	such	as	modification	of	defences,	
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penalties,	procedural	safeguards	and	diversionary	programmes.	Note	that	particular	statutes	can	
include	 provisions	 which	 belong	 to	 more	 than	 one	 modality;	 nor,	 indeed,	 are	 classifications	
mutually	exclusive	(for	example,	a	provision	might	be	both	expansive	and	victim‐oriented).		
	
In	 terms	 of	 the	 classification	 scheme	 sketched	 above,	 the	modalities	 approach	 is	 accordingly	
concerned,	at	least	primarily,	not	so	much	with	substantive	criminalisation	and	the	outcomes	of	
criminalisation	 processes,	 but	 with	 formal	 criminalisation	 and	 with	 the	 varied	 processes	 of	
formal	 criminalisation.	 And,	 in	 terms	 of	 its	 power	 to	 accurately	 track	 and	 illuminate	 this	 key	
aspect	 of	 criminalisation,	 the	 modalities	 framework	 is	 a	 very	 significant	 advance.	 For,	
notwithstanding	its	focus	on	legislative	change,	its	scheme	for	tracking	that	change	ensures	that	
it	 is	picking	up	on	a	range	of	 formal	changes—notably	procedural	and	punitive,	pre‐and	post‐
conviction—which	 are	 likely	 (though	 not	 certainly)	 to	 have	 material	 effects	 on	 substantive	
criminalisation,	 and	 which,	 hence,	 equip	 the	 field	 to	 coordinate	 research	 on	 formal	 and	
substantive	criminalisation	in	a	much	more	satisfactory	way	than	has	until	now	been	possible.	
We	 might	 say	 that	 the	 modalities	 approach	 conceptualises	 criminalisation	 in	 a	 way	 which	
matches	 the	aspirations	of	 texts	such	as	Bronitt	and	McSherry	 (2017),	Brown	et	al.	 (2015)	or	
Wells	and	Quick	(2010)—or	that	is	reflected	in	Ashworth’s	heroic	work	in	producing	over	many	
years	three	texts	covering	the	criminal	process,	criminal	law	and	sentencing	(Ashworth’s	single	
authored	editions	of	each	of	 these	books	appeared,	 respectively,	 in	1983,	1991	and	1994:	see	
Ashworth	2015;	Ashworth	and	Redmayne	2010;	Horder	2016).	 It	does	so	by	recognising	 that	
even	the	formal	boundaries	of	criminal	law	are	set	by	legal	norms	beyond	those	of	the	substantive	
criminal	law:	norms	within	regulatory	regimes;	civil	orders	whose	breach	can	invoke	what	are,	
in	effect,	criminal	penalties;	procedural	rules;	bail	and	sentencing	provisions;	and	so	on.		
	
The	modalities	team’s	analytic	scheme	accordingly	does	much	to	assist	the	effort	to	displace	what	
many	scholars	have	 long	 felt	 to	be	an	unsatisfactory	marginalisation	of	 regulatory	norms	and	
procedural	issues	in	criminal	law	scholarship.	And	the	authors’	own	identification	of	a	trend,	in	
the	 large	 sample	 of	 Victoria,	 New	 South	Wales	 and	 Queensland	 statutes	 which	 they	 analyse,	
towards	a	focus	on	the	criminalisation	of	risk	exemplifies	the	capacity	of	their	conceptual	scheme	
to	underpin	a	substantive	interpretation	of	the	direction	of	criminalisation	trends,	and	to	do	so	
on	a	more	robust	methodological	basis	than,	for	example,	I	was	able	to	provide	for	my	broadly	
similar	interpretation	of	recent	trends	in	England	and	Wales	(Lacey	2016).		
	
That	 said,	 some	questions	may	 be	 raised	 about	 the	modalities	 scheme	 as	 it	 currently	 stands,	
taking	it	on	its	own	terms	as	an	analytic	model	of	formal	criminalisation.		
	
First,	it	is	not	clear	that	the	four	principal	modalities	are	all	conceptualised	in	comparable	ways.	
The	 first	 two	 have	 to	 do	 with	 the	 boundaries	 of	 criminalisation:	 the	 third	 and	 fourth	 with	
distinctive	motivations	for	shifting	those	boundaries.	In	the	team’s	terms,	then,	the	first	two	have	
to	do	with	the	‘how’	and	‘when’	of	criminalisation,	the	third	and	fourth	have	more	to	do	with	the	
‘why’.	This	does	not	necessarily	matter	but	it	should	perhaps	be	noted	more	explicitly	than	it	is	in	
the	team’s	exposition	so	far.	One	obvious	question	which	this	raises	is:	if	we	have	two	modalities	
which	are	motivated	by	broad	policy	or	ethical	concerns,	might	there	not	be	other,	comparable	
motivations,	 ones	which	 systematically	 drive	 the	 deployment	 of	 criminalising	 power,	 equally	
calling	 to	 be	 tracked?	 Can	 we	 necessarily	 distinguish	 victim‐orientation,	 for	 example,	 from	
substantive	aims	such	as	dealing	with	a	perceived	threat	of	terrorism	or	other	distinctive	forms	
of	public	disorder?	Again,	this	is	not	necessarily	a	problem	but	we	need	to	be	clear‐sighted	about	
the	fact	that	the	third	and	fourth	modalities—and	in	particular	the	fourth—are	interpretive	and	
historically	contingent	in	a	way	which	is	not	the	case	for	the	first	and	second.		
	
Second,	while	 the	 range	 of	 sub‐modalities	 and	 the	 practice	 of	 allowing	 a	 single	 statute	 to	 be	
counted	in	more	than	one	modality	and	sub‐modality	is	a	huge	advance	in	terms	of	capturing	the	
details	 of	 trends	 in	 a	 conceptually	 manageable,	 indeed,	 elegant	 way,	 this	 method	 cannot,	
inevitably,	 give	us	much	 sense	of	 scale.	A	provision	which	 reintroduced	 the	death	penalty	 for	
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murder,	for	example,	would	count	as	an	instance	of	sub‐modality	Ic,	just	as	would	a	provision	to	
increase	the	maximum	penalty	for	theft	from	five	years	to	six	years	or	to	increase	a	maximum	fine	
for	a	traffic	violation	from	$100	to	$150.	Also	note	that	the	counting	system	inevitably	reflects	
legislative	drafting	style	in	a	way	which	may	further	distort	our	perception	of	scale;	for	example,	
a	statute	like	the	English	Theft	Act	(1968),	which	enunciates	one	broad	offence	of	theft,	will	imply	
a	lesser	score,	including	in	relation	to	subsequent	amendments,	than	a	legislative	scheme	which	
differentiates	many	different	offences	within	a	particular	area,	 the	Misuse	of	Drugs	Act	(1971)	
being	a	good	example	in	England	and	Wales.	And	sometimes	it	can	be	hard	even	to	decide	what	
counts	as	a	single	offence	as,	for	example,	where	aggravated	forms	or	alternative	modalities	of	a	
single	offence	are	created.	
	
Third,	 even	 as	 a	 measure	 of	 formal	 criminalisation,	 the	 modalities	 approach	 is	 arguably	 not	
complete.	This	is	because	it	excludes	judicial	decisions,	which	are	not	only	forms	of	substantive	
criminalisation	but	may	also,	in	Australian	jurisdictions	as	in	England	and	Wales,	shift	the	formal	
boundaries	of	criminalisation.	
	
Notwithstanding	these	quibbles—and	doubtless	others	will	see	different	points	to	take	up	and	
elaborate—the	modalities	team	are	to	be	congratulated	on	having	made	a	decisive	contribution	
to	criminal	law	scholarship,	taking	our	capacity	to	track	the	overall—as	well	as	the	site‐specific—
boundaries	of	criminalisation	in	particular	systems	to	a	new	level	of	sophistication.		
	
…	and	beyond	formal	criminalisation?	
I	have	already	mentioned	that	the	modalities	approach	explicitly	engages	with	legislation	and,	
hence,	with	the	formal	boundaries	of	criminalisation	and	its	processes,	albeit	conceptualised	in	a	
distinctively	 and	 helpfully	 broad	 and	 differentiated	way.	 But,	 in	 light	 of	 the	 key	 relevance	 of	
substantive	criminalisation	and	of	criminalisation	as	a	social	outcome,	to	socio‐legal	studies	and	
criminology	 in	 particular	 and	 to	 the	 social	 sciences	more	 generally,	 it	 seems	 fair	 to	 ask	what	
contribution	the	modalities	approach	might	make	to	this	broader	scholarly	agenda.	Indeed	such	
an	evaluation	is	invited	by	the	team’s	aspiration	to	understand	not	only	the	‘why,	when	and	how’	
of	criminalisation	but	also	its	effects.	(Of	course,	formal	criminalisation	is	itself	an	effect:	but	my	
reading	of	the	team’s	opening	claim,	quoted	above,	is	that	their	ambition	is	broader	than	this.)		
	
Here	I	think	we	must	hope	that	the	current	elaboration	of	the	modalities	approach	is	the	first,	
substantial	 step	 in—as	 well	 as	 the	 cornerstone	 of—a	 broader	 project	 which	 articulates	 the	
current	 iteration.	Let	us	call	 it	 ‘Modalities	1’,	with	a	 ‘Modalities	2’	 framework	which	draws	on	
socio‐legal	theory	and	on	currently	available	interpretive	accounts	to	build	a	broader	model	for	
understanding	not	only	the	social	effects	of	criminalisation	but	also	the	reasons	for	which	it	is	
invoked:	the	‘why’	of	which	they	currently	capture	only	victim‐orientation	and	the	aspiration	to	
rationalise.	Admittedly,	it	will	not	be	possible	to	do	this	in	the	analytically	elegant	manner	which	
they	have	achieved	in	‘Modalities	1’.	But,	it	seems	to	me	that	one	of	the	exciting	challenges	here	
would	be,	indeed,	to	build	a	‘Modalities	2’	which	would	bring	‘Modalities	1’	into	dialogue	with	the	
existing	 literature	 which	 advances	 general	 theses	 about	 the	 why	 and	 the	 with	 what	 effect:	
whether	 these	 be	 claims	 about	 the	move	 to	 risk	 prevention,	 a	 resurgence	 of	 character‐based	
criminalisation,	 an	 ‘insecurity	 state’,	 ‘governing	 through	crime’,	or	 a	 return	 to	 the	 ‘punishable	
subject’	(Ashworth	and	Zedner	2014;	Farmer	2016;	Lacey	2016;	Ramsay	2012;	Simon	2007).	This	
could	 offer	 a	 more	 nuanced	 frame	 for	 assessing	 the	 scale,	 speed	 and	 importance	 of	 the	
developments	which	 other	 scholars	 have	 identified	with	 site‐specific	 studies.	 Indeed,	 in	 their	
engagement	with	the	‘new	penology’	(Feeley	and	Simon	1992,	1994),	the	modalities	team	have	
already	taken	their	first	steps	in	this	direction.	I	will	surely	not	be	the	only	scholar	watching	with	
great	interest,	and	high	expectations,	as	they	develop	their	valuable	and	ambitious	project.	
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